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Abstract:  
 
The economics profession not only failed to predict the recent financial crisis, but has 
been struggling in its aftermath to reach a consensus on the cause(s) of the crisis.  While 
competing narratives are being offered and evaluated, the narrow scope of the debate on 
strictly technical aspects of monetary policy has precluded the examination of broader 
questions of political economy that may prove to be of greater import. Attempting to find 
the technically optimal policy is futile when policy is crafted and implemented in a 
contemporary democratic setting characterized not by omniscience and benevolence, but 
by fallibility and competing special interest factions. Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, 
F.A. Hayek and James Buchanan each sought ways to constrain a monetary authority and 
each ended up rejecting the possibility of doing so. We incorporate their experiences to 
make a case for applying the concepts of robust political economy to the Federal Reserve. 
Robust political economy calls for relaxing idealized assumptions in order to seek out 
institutional regimes that can overcome both the epistemic and motivational hurdles that 
characterize contemporary democratic settings.  
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“To shy away from consideration of the politically feasible has been deemed an 
admirable trait, but to refuse to examine the politically possible is incomplete 
scholarship.” 
-Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan, 1962 
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1 Introduction  
The recent financial crisis caught the economics profession off-guard, with no immediate 
explanation for the cause of the financial crisis.  Old hypotheses are being revived, and a 
few new ones advanced, but even two years after its onset, the profession is still 
struggling to come to a consensus on the cause(s) of crisis, let alone come to a consensus 
on what alternative courses of action could have been taken to prevent it. Monetary 
theorists have devoted a considerable amount of their scholarly attention to examining the 
role of monetary policy in the financial crisis, as well as examining the propriety of the 
chosen monetary policy measures taken in the wake of the financial crisis.  These 
technical debates are certainly vital to sort out, especially with the reemergence of 
previously disbanded Keynesian remedies (see Boettke, Smith & Snow, forthcoming).  
Yet, with the debate so intently focused on calculating the technical specificities of what 
monetary authorities did or didn’t do correctly, the profession is missing the insights that 
a broader perspective of political economy could bring. Friedman (1947, 415), in his 
review of Abba Lerner’s Economics of Control, criticized the strictly technical focus of 
Lerner, 
“…Lerner writes as if it were possible to base conclusions about 
appropriate institutional arrangements almost exclusively on analysis of 
the formal conditions for an optimum. Unfortunately, this cannot be done. 
It has been long known that there are alternative institutional 
arrangements that would enable the formal conditions for an optimum to 
be attained.” 
 
While the political economy costs are often acknowledged, or at least admitted, they are 
not being fully absorbed into the current analyses of the crisis.  From the start it is 
assumed that the Federal Reserve has the motivational and cognitive skills necessary to 
achieve the goals entrusted to them, as long as economists hand them the right theory to 
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work with.  From there, the debate focuses exclusively on which theory is the correct 
theory for the Federal Reserve to work off of.  As Kane (1980) explains it,  
“[t]his utopian conception of Fed intentions and tactics is carefully 
nurtured in Fed publications and official statements. Fed leaders depict 
themselves as waiting in anguish for the economics profession finally to 
develop an adequate model of how monetary policy truly works.” 
 
Robust political economy theoretically denies politicians and bureaucrats the unrealistic 
assumptions of omniscience and benevolence.  A consistent behavioral assumption is 
applied to both economic man and political man, one that accounts for his self-interest, 
short-sightedness and knavery.  In other words, robust political economy holds that 
political institutions must be designed robustly for the real erring man, not designed 
fragilely for the nonexistent perfect man. In addition, robust political economy factors 
into account incentives and information, and the costs of administration, which are 
ignored in technical debates.  
With the U.S. national debt approach $13.7 trillion, making the gross debt to GDP 
ratio close to 94% (see Graph 1), perhaps the U.S. has found itself in the position 
discussed by Adam Smith in Book 5 of the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1981[1776]). 
Smith argues that once a government’s debt has accumulated to a certain extent, the 
chances of it actually being paid off become increasingly smaller because governments 
will avoid politically unpopular solutions such as cutting spending or raising taxes.  
Instead, governments will resort to ‘juggling tricks’ to attempt to push the debt problems 
into the future. Historically, one of the favored and pernicious ‘tricks’ employed by 
governments to stave off the problems of debt into the future is through currency 
inflation. The monetary base in the U.S. has more than doubled in the last couple years, 
in November, 2009 it stands at $1.9 trillion (see Graph 2).   
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A fascinating window into the robust political economy of money and banking 
can be gleaned by a study of the evolution of the ideas of Nobel Laureates Milton 
Friedman, F.A. Hayek and James Buchanan on monetary policy.  Though they are often 
seen as clashing vociferously on issues in economics despite their ideological kinship, on 
the question of monetary policy they all advocated versions of a monetary rule within a 
central bank regime only to abandon faith in monetary policy-makers and to advocate the 
substitution of a computer (Friedman), the denationalization of money altogether (Hayek) 
and Constitutionalization (Buchanan) later in their lives.   
In section 2 we explore the development of F.A. Hayek’s thinking on monetary 
regimes. We do the same for Milton Friedman in section 3, and James Buchanan in 
section 4. Section 5 examines the influence of public choice on monetary institution 
analysis. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 F. A. Hayek from Monetary Nationalism to Denationalization of Money 
Hayek stressed the need for a central bank in his early works.  Hayek (1978[1960], 324) 
argued that we could not rely on the spontaneous forces of the market to supply a reliable 
means of exchange, 
“It is important to be clear at the outset that this is not only politically 
impracticable today but would probably be undesirable if it were 
possible.”  
 
In a footnote, Hayek (1978[1960], 520) explained his position, stating that he was 
convinced that a central bank was necessary, though he was also doubtful whether it was 
desirable or necessary for there to be a government monopoly on note issue.  Hayek 
(1978[1960], 325) referred to money as a sort of a ‘loose joint’ in an otherwise self-
adjusting market economy, one that if it was not correct, could interfere with the entire 
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self-adjustment process of the market, and rendering a central bank was necessary. He 
provided three reasons for this view. First, he held that disruptions in the supply of 
money were far more harmful to the economy than disruptions in other commodities. 
Changes in the supply of money cause ripples that gradually expand throughout the 
economy, altering relative prices, thus Hayek argued, a monetary authority was necessary 
for stability.  
Second, Hayek felt that a central bank was necessary because the supply of 
money was closely related to credit. For Hayek, a central bank was necessary to avoid 
recurring fluctuations by supplying or restricting credit when the spontaneous 
fluctuations of the market caused either an oversupply or undersupply of credit.  Hayek 
believed, at that time, that this was a function that could not be carried out by market 
forces.  
Third, Hayek believed a central bank was necessary because of the magnitude of 
government expenditures in relation to national income.  While he held that the high level 
of government expenditure was undesirable, Hayek felt a central bank was necessary if it 
did exist. While Hayek argued that it would be desirable to divorce monetary institutions 
as much as possible from fiscal policy financing, under these conditions of high 
government expenditures, relative to national income, Hayek held that monetary policy 
needed to be coordinated with the financing of fiscal policies. 
Hayek (1976a) showed a growing disillusionment over the ability of government 
to manage monetary affairs with the publication of Choice in Currency, an essay based 
off a speech he had delivered at the Geneva Gold and Monetary Conference, 
“I do not want to question that a very intelligent and wholly independent 
national or international monetary authority might do better than an 
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international gold standard, or any other sort of automatic system. But I 
see not the slightest hope that any government, or any institution subject 
to political pressure, will ever be able to act in such a manner.”  
 
Hayek went on, “…money is certainly too dangerous an instrument to leave to the 
fortuitous expediency of politicians – or, it seems, economists.” Hayek (1976b) followed 
up this lecture with a more in depth publication, the Denationalisation of Money.  In it, 
Hayek explores the theoretical possibility and political feasibility of eliminating 
government’s monopoly on note issue due to his frustration with government’s monopoly 
on currency invariably leading to inflation, economic instability, undisciplined fiscal 
profligacy and economic nationalism.  
 Hayek now held that in a contemporary democratic setting, characterized by 
special interest groups, there will always be some group clamoring for inflationary 
measures that will benefit them in the short-term. Politicians, thinking not about the long-
run consequences of their policies, but their next election, have the incentive to pursue 
inflationary policies, even if they are at odds with the general interest. These inflationary 
policies, along with their concomitant artificially low interest rates, which disable the free 
market natural interest rate brake (Hayek 1975 [1933], 94), leads to unsustainable 
overinvestment.  Absence politically unpopular, and economic disastrous perpetual 
inflation, this overinvestment must eventually come to an end, leading to a recession as 
resources are reallocated to bring the distribution of the type of the supply of capital and 
labor resources into alignment with the that of demand (Hayek 1950). The control of 
money also assisted in the wholesale adoption of Keynesian policies in the political 
realm.  Government has witnessed a vast increase in size, relative to national income, 
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since the elimination of a budgetary check on fiscal policies due to its ability to 
commandeer monetary policy.  
Allowing competition in currency, Hayek (1976b, 100) argues, is the only way to 
eliminate these undesirable features of government control, 
“We have always had bad money because private enterprise was not 
permitted to give us a better one. In a world governed by the pressure of 
organized interests, the important truth to keep in mind is that we cannot 
count on intelligence or understanding but only on sheer self-interest to 
give us the institutions we need. Blessed indeed will be the day when it will 
no longer be from the benevolence of the government that we expect good 
money but from the regard of the banks for their own interest.”  
 
Hayek goes on,  
“A single monopolistic governmental agency can neither possess the 
information which should govern the supply of money nor would it, if it 
knew what it ought to do in the general interest, usually be in a position to 
act in that manner…Money is not a tool of policy that can achieve 
particular foreseeable results by control of its quantity. But it should be 
part of the self-steering mechanism by which individuals are constantly 
induced to adjust their activities to circumstances on which they have 
information only through the abstract signal of prices.”  
 
To be accurate, Hayek wasn’t actually advancing ideas that were entirely new to him, just 
ones that he previously entertained and germinated but never fully developed 
theoretically until later in his life. Hayek (1950, 184) had entertained doubts about the 
ability of a monetary authority to constrain themselves prior to his arguments for the 
necessity of a central bank in the Constitution of Liberty, 
“It was certainly wise that at a time when the scope and objectives of 
monetary policy were much more limited, its direction was placed in the 
hands of bodies not directly subject to political control. It is 
understandable and perhaps inevitable that once the much greater use of 
these powers is recognised, it should become a major political issue. But it 
must appear more than doubtful whether in the nature of democratic 
institutions it is possible that democratic governments will ever learn to 
exercise that restraint, which is the essence of economic wisdom of not 
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using palliatives for present evils which not only create worse problems 
later but also constantly restrict the freedom of further action.” 
 
Hayek (1978a) released a second edition of the Denationalisation of Money, with the 
subtitle, “The Argument Refined,” which expanded upon and added to his arguments in 
the first edition.  Most conspicuously is the expansion of his “Monetary Policy Neither 
Desirable Nor Possible” chapter, which included an addition of a subchapter on “The 
abolition of Central Banks,” in which Hayek argues that with the elimination of 
government’s monopoly on money would come the elimination of the central bank, as 
well as, in particular, government interest rate policy.  Just like any other price in the 
market, Hayek argued that interest rates should be allowed to develop in the free market, 
transmitting the myriad circumstances affecting the supply and demand of money that no 
central agency could ever know. Though, even under this regime, the government would 
still have some influence over interest rates through debt financed fiscal policies, but it 
could no longer artificially keep the interest rate low in order to borrow cheaply.  Hayek 
(1999[1980], 239) argued in free market competition of currency that,  
“…a private institution which must issue money in competition with others 
can only remain in business if it provides the people with a stable money 
which it can trust. The slightest suspicion that the issuer was abusing his 
position when issuing money would lead to a depreciation of its value and 
would at once drive him out of business. The constant danger of losign the 
customers of one’s business is a better disciplining force and will be more 
effective to maintain the value of money, than anything else. It would 
operate in such a way that, at the slightest rumor that one money was 
decreasing in value as compared to other currencies, everybody would try 
to get rid of the money threatened with depreciation and exchange it for a 
money which inspires more confidence.”  
 
 
 
4  Milton Friedman from the Quantity Theory Restated to K% to Inflation 
Targeting 
 
 9
In his early work, Friedman (2002[1962]0, 38), argued that a central bank was necessary 
to “…provide a stable monetary framework for a free economy…” as part of providing a 
stable legal and economic framework that would allow individuals to carry out their own 
plans. Even in those early days, Friedman (2002[1962], 27) understood the importance of 
the monetary function, and the importance of properly monitoring and restraining the 
authority,  
“Government responsibility for the monetary system as long been 
recognized. It is explicitly provided for in the constitutional provision 
which gives Congress the power “to coin money, regulate the value 
thereof, and of foreign coin.” There is probably no other area of economic 
activity with respect to which government action has been so uniformly 
accepted. This habitual and by now almost unthinking acceptance of 
governmental responsibility makes thorough understanding of the grounds 
for such responsibility all the more necessary, since it enhances the 
danger that the scope of government will spread from ativities that are, to 
those that are not, appropriate in a free society, from providing a 
monetary framework to determining the allocation of resources among 
individuals.”  
 
Friedman (1968, 12), believed that the proper conduct of monetary policy should 
be to pursue such policies as would ensure that money does not become a source 
of economic disturbance.  Friedman sought to create a monetary regime that 
entrusted the Federal Reserve with enough discretion to achieve this goal, but also 
limited the ability of the Federal Reserve to generate adverse swings in policy by 
giving the Federal Reserve a stated and known target rate of currency growth.  
Friedman argued that this type of monetary regime was not only optimal, but 
politically feasible as well, 
“…steady monetary growth would provide a monetary climate favorable 
to the effective operations of those basic forces of enterprise, ingenuity, 
invention, hard work, and thrift that are the true springs of economic 
growth.  That is the most we can ask from monetary policy at our present 
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stage of knowledge.  But that much—and it is a great deal—is clearly 
within our reach.”   
 
Friedman (2002[1962], 38) argued for chartering a course for monetary policy in between 
two extreme views that he felt were economically and politically undesirable. The one 
course, which he labeled the ‘Scylla’ belief, held that a purely automated gold standard 
was the only politically feasible and economically desirable monetary regime. The other 
course, which he labeled the ‘Charybdis’ view, held that the monetary authority should 
be granted wide discretionary powers in order to respond to unforeseen circumstances. 
Both views, he believed, had failed in the past, and would likely continue to fail in the 
future.  Friedman (2002[1962], 54) proposed doing this by a legislated rule that would 
mandate a specific rate of growth in the stock of money for the monetary authority. In 
addition, and less important, proposed additional restraints on the monetary authority’s 
discretion in choice of methods to achieve the target rate of growth in the money stock in 
order to eliminate the “…the present governmental intervention into lending and 
investing activity…” and to turn government “…financing operations from a perpetual 
source of instability and uncertainty into a reasonably regular and predictable activity.” 
This type of rule would be the “…only feasible device currently available for converting 
monetary policy into a pillar of a free society rather than a threat to its foundations.”  
Perhaps Friedman’s early views are best summed up by Kane (1980), 
“…monetarism can be interpreted as a compromise movement whose 
principal goal is to liberate the Fed from procyclical political pressures 
by refocusing the Fed’s intermediate policy targets from sectorally non-
neutral interest rates to average rates of growth in monetary aggregates. 
The monetarist control strategy holds out the hope that the Fed can 
validate the utopian conception by loudly and steadfastly denying all 
responsibility for stabilizing nominal interest rates in the short run.” 
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Roughly 20 years later, Friedman & Schwartz (1986, 59) revealed that their belief in the 
desired course had moved closer to the ‘Scyalla’ view, and that monetary authority 
should be more tightly bound, 
“Even granted the market failures that we and many other economists had 
attributed to a strictly laissez-faire policy in money and banking, the 
course of events encouraged the view that turning to government as an 
alternative was a cure that was worse than the disease, at least with 
existing government policies and institutions.  Government failure might 
be worse than market failure…Our personal conclusion…is that rigid 
monetary rule is preferable to discretionary monetary management by the 
Federal Reserve.” 
 
Friedman’s development in his thinking on the proper monetary regime showed an even 
more abrupt turnabout after another 20 years.  When asked if it would be desirable to turn 
monetary policy over to a computer, in an interview published posthumously, Friedman 
(2007) replied,   
“Yes. Of course it depends very much on how the computer is 
programmed. I am not saying that any computer program would do. In 
speaking of that, I have had in mind the idea that a computer would 
produce, for example, a constant rate of growth in the quantity of money 
as defined, let us say, by M2, something like 3% to 5% per year. There are 
certainly occasions in which discretionary changes in policy guided by a 
wise and talented manager of monetary policy would do better than the 
fixed rate, but they would be rare. 
 
In any event, the computer program would certainly prevent any major 
disasters either way, any major inflation or any major depressions. One of 
the great defects of our kind of monetary system is that its performance 
depends so much on the quality of the people who are put in charge. We 
have seen that in the history of our own Federal Reserve System. Surely a 
computer would have produced far better results during the 1930s and 
during both world wars. 
 
That raises a question about the desirability of our present monetary 
system. It is one in which a group of unelected people have enormous 
power, power which can lead to a great depression or which can lead to a 
great inflation. Is it wise to have that power in those hands?” 
 
Friedman, even went on to suggest the elimination of the Federal Reserve, 
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“An alternative would be to eliminate the Federal Reserve System; to 
reduce the monetary activities of the federal government to the provision 
of high-powered money, that is, currency and bank reserves, and to 
constitutionalize, as it were, what is to be done with high-powered money. 
My preference is simply to hold it constant and let financial developments 
produce the growth in the quantity of money in the form of bank deposits, 
a process that has been going on for many decades. But that is, of course, 
politically impossible.” 
 
 
5 James Buchanan From Brick Standard to Monetary Constitution 
 
James Buchanan, sought to bring his extensive work on rule-making to bear in 
envisioning a monetary regime that could operate within a contemporary democratic 
setting. From the start, Buchanan (1999[1962]) eschewed the ‘presuppositions of Harvey 
road’ that held that economic policy would be crafted and implemented by a group of 
benevolent and enlightened elites.  Buchanan set out to make the case for a monetary 
regime using comparative institutional analysis that compared monetary regimes in real, 
not ideal settings.   
Buchanan (1999[1962]) believed that it was not so much the specific type of 
monetary regime adopted, but the set of rules that defined that regime.  Buchanan argued 
that the brick standard, a labor standard, or a manager confined by well-defined rules, 
would all put a stop to the government growth let loose by the fiscal profligacy 
encouraged by the wide scale acceptance of Keynesian ideas in the political realm (see 
Buchanan and Wagner (2000[1977]). The brick standard, as defined by Buchanan, would 
be a monetary regime that allowed anyone to go to the mint with a standard building 
brick of a specified quality and exchange it for the monetary unit, and vice versa. As the 
general price level fluctuated, market forces would cause automatic adjustments as 
people would exchange money for bricks when the price level rose above the equilibrium 
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level, and bricks for money when the price level fell below the equilibrium level. Under 
this regime, market actors, guided by profits and losses would be the mechanism that 
achieved price predictability, not a government-entity entrusted with the goal of 
achieving it. In addition, a brick standard would, most likely, divorce domestic monetary 
policy from international balance of payment and exchange rate policies due to the fact 
that a brick standard would be unsuitable for those purposes.  
 For Buchanan (1999[1962], 417), it came down to a toss-up between a brick type 
standard and a limited manager. What mattered most for monetary predictability was that 
the rules that set up the monetary regime must be of the ‘constitutional’ variety.  In other 
words, the rules must be set to be ‘relatively absolute absolutes’ in order to protect them 
from tampering.  
 After witnessing the Keynesian-inspired growth in government, Buchanan 
became more wary of the ability to confine a monetary authority.  Buchanan (1986) “[a]t 
best, therefore, the truly benevolent despot can only be partially successful, even given 
the most clearly defined target for policy.” Then criticizing the benevolence assumption, 
Buchanan goes on “…it is evidence, quite apart from any historical record, that the 
despot will find it advantageous to resort to money creation over and beyond any amount 
that might characterize the ‘ideal’ behavior of the benevolent counterpart considered 
above.”  
In the wake of the onset of the current financial crisis, Buchanan’s (2009a) views 
have progressed even further, 
“Critical evaluation and assessment suggests that the structure of the 
whole monetary economy is flawed, which points toward genuine 
constitutional revolution rather than either a change in participants or 
piecemeal adjustments in the regulatory apparatus.” 
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Buchanan (2009b) went so far as to assert that “…the 2009 monetary settings 
carries an eerie similarity to that in the seventeenth-century imagination of 
Thomas Hobbes concerning nonmonetary rights and claims.”  Buchanan goes on 
to argue for the constitutionalization of money, 
“Explicit constitutionalism would also embody the requirement that the 
monetary authority itself be bound by the rules of basic contract. Beyond 
narrow limits, discretion on the part of the authority goes outside the 
dictates of constitutional criteria.”  
 
 
5 The Public Choice Awakening of the 3 Leading Classical Liberal Thinkers in 
the 20th Century 
 
Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan all set out to find a monetary regime that could be 
constrained. Each of them ended up rejecting the possibility, mainly due to the fact that 
the Federal Reserve seems incapable of being independent of the Federal Government. 
Since the inception of the Federal Reserve, and especially since the Great Depression, 
when theories about the mismanagement of the Central Bank started to be advanced, 
there has been the question of how independent can the Federal Reserve be in a 
contemporary democratic setting.  Despite the façade of independence, there are key 
channels of influence that politicians exert over the Federal Reserve. The chief officials 
are nominated by the president and approved by the senate. Furthermore they are 
subjected to highly publicized Congressional committee hearings on a regular basis on 
their performance. 
 Given that there is a political influence exerted on the Federal Reserve, there is a 
line of research that seeks to discover the particular way in which this influence is 
manifested. Kane (1980) argues that politicians purposely foster the image of Federal 
Reserve independence in order to use it as a scapegoat during economic downturns. Kane 
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addresses the inability of the Federal Reserve to even get close to its target policies in the 
late 1970s, and questions the ability of target rates to rein in political influence, “[g]iven 
that the ranges are fairly wide to begin with and change only slightly from one 
Congressional appearance to the next, the Fed’s failure to meet them leads one to doubt 
whether in any meaningful sense they are targets (or limits of ‘tolerance’) at all.”  Kane 
came to the conclusion that the Federal Reserve, in essence operates as a scapegoat for 
incumbent politicians especially in order to increase the monetary base in order to 
decrease unemployment. Any unfavorable economic performance is subsequently blamed 
on the Federal Reserve, typically illustrated by the frequent congressional hearings that 
the FED chairman is subjected to during economic downturns.  
 Political business cycles are another theory offered for how political influence is 
exerted over the Federal Reserve. Nordhaus (1975) framed the general political trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, and theorized that politicians have the incentive to 
maintain fiscal austerity at the beginning of a term, and then engage in fiscal profligacy 
when it came time for an election. This theory was purported to be supported with 
empirical research done by Kramer (1971), Fair (1978) and Tufte (1975).  Alesina and 
Sachs (1988), believing the evidence on political business cycles to be inconclusive, 
refine the Nordhaus model to include partisan considerations, as well as rational and 
forward looking expectations. Since each political party pursues a different 
inflation/unemployment policy agenda, during election periods, the future policy trade off 
between inflation and unemployment is uncertain. They offer empirical evidence to 
support their thesis that a partisan political business model more accurately describes the 
particular way in which political factors influence monetary policy.  
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 Instead of characterizing the political business cycle as a tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment, Wagner (1977), explains political business cycles as the 
result of politicians attempting to increase spending in swing districts. Policies that 
attempt to decrease unemployment across the board would be inferior to using 
government seigniorage to fund projects in key districts as a re-election strategy. Scholars 
began to more heavily question the unrealistic incentives imparted to monetary 
authorities. Kane (1980), eschewing the ideal assumptions of benevolence on the part of 
the Federal Reserve, 
“Economist critiques of FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) policy 
choices typically treat the Federal Reserve System as a sovereign decision 
maker, whose managers seek single mindedly to promote the public 
interest at every turn. From this perspective, choosing strategy and tactics 
for monetary control becomes a straightforward exercise in applied 
welfare economics, albeit one with difficult stochastic complications. With 
Fed bureaucracy and bureaucrats having no contending interests of their 
own, the central bank’s policy task becomes merely to maximize the 
expected value of a constrained social welfare function. This utopian 
objective function is defined over a set of policy gods (ideal values for 
specific dimensions of national economic performance) and is represented 
as a decreasing function of squared (or absolute) deviations from these 
goals.” 
 
Eventually the question scholars came to focus their attention on is not if the Federal 
Reserve was independent, but given that it wasn’t, what mechanisms could be used to 
restrain it.  There has been an ongoing debate as to the desirability of constraining the 
Federal Reserve with stringent rules or allowing the Federal Reserve the leeway to 
respond to changing economic circumstances. Stokey (2002) summarizes the debate after 
25 years,  
“Of course, in the long run monetary and fiscal policy are linked through 
the government's budget constraint. Good monetary policy is simply in-
feasible without a conservative (balanced budget) fiscal policy. A 
government that runs substantial deficits, with no prospect of surpluses to 
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retire the accumulating debt, will eventually fail in its efforts to float new 
bond issues. The problem is exacerbated if, as is typically the case, old 
debt must be rolled over as well. At some point the only feasible options 
are outright default, a large devaluation, or both. A government facing 
that situation typically finds the seignorage revenue from a large 
devaluation too attractive to resist, and monetary policy becomes the 
fiscal policy of last resort.” 
 
Selgin, Lastrapes and White (2010), using the Fed’s own objectives, evaluate the record 
of its record, finding that since the inception of the Fed, there have been more symptoms 
of monetary and macroeconomic instability. Given this failure, it is perplexing that the 
contemporary debate on the appropriate Fed policy, especially in the wake of the 
financial crisis, has lead to a concentration of scholarly focus on the technical 
considerations of monetary theory.  Once in this debate, economists lose sight of an 
essential wisdom of the classical political economists, as F. A. Hayek wrote, 
“...the main point about which there can be little doubt is that [Adam] 
Smith's chief concern was not so much with what man might occasionally 
achieve when he was at his best but that he should have as little 
opportunity as possible to do harm when he was at his worst.  It would 
scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism 
which he and his contemporaries advocated is that is a system under 
which bad men can do least harm.  It is a social system which does not 
depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on 
all men becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of men in 
all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes 
bad, sometimes intelligent  and more often stupid.” 
 
A research program in robust political economy is one that sets on an intellectual quest to 
find an institutional set that permits neither the assumption of benevolence nor the 
assumption omniscience (Boettke and Leeson, 2004).  David Hume once remarked that it 
is a maxim that,  
“…in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks 
and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, 
and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.  By this 
interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, 
notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public 
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good.  Without this," Hume adds, "we shall in vain boast of the 
advantages of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no 
security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our 
rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all.” 
 
It wasn’t until the adoption of public choice into economics that these postulates of Smith 
and Hume were more fully incorporated into the theorizing of the economics profession. 
Buchanan and Brennan (1981) 
“The model of political process implicitly assumed in most orthodox 
discussion of economic policy has made profoundly different assumptions 
about individual behaviour from the corresponding assumptions made in 
market settings. It has only been in the last 20 years with the burgeoning 
of public choice that this grotesque asymmetry has been exposed, and the 
‘benevolent despot’ model of politics been seriously queried.” 
 
Unfortunately, these essential wisdoms have not been incorporated into monetary theory. 
In discussing monetary policy in the wake of the crisis there are theoretical ideas which 
many believe to be true which are in fact not true, and there are ideas which while true 
are impractical at the current moment.  But there are also ideas which are only true if we 
permit the introduction of assumptions which should not be permitted if we want to think 
about robust political economy. It does us little good to assume benevolence and 
omniscience on the part of public policy decision makers. 
 Perhaps the only way to constrain monetary policy is by eliminating the state 
monopoly of it. Instead of seeking technical optimums that are never realized in practice 
due to the frailty of the Federal Reserve to the pressures and shortcomings of the 
contemporary democratic setting in which policy is actually enacted. A free market in 
banking, just as the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers realized for any free market, is 
robust to short-sightedness and knavery, unlike arguments for government control which 
so often rest on assumptions of benevolence and omniscience rending the government 
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institution unsuited for realistic conditions. White and Selgin (1994) in their summary of 
the insights found in free banking literature strongly suggest that this alternative is viable. 
Selgin, Lastrapes and White (2010) offer  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
What in our contemporary history of central bank policy should give us any reason to not 
follow Friedman and tie the hands of the monetary authority so tightly that the bonds 
cannot be broken, let alone Hayek and point out that the only robust political economy 
option when it comes to central banking is to abolish it? While Hayek, Friedman and 
Buchanan lead us towards this solution through their evolving ideas and scholarship on 
the application of the concepts of robust political economy to monetary regimes, there 
has been recent scholarship that has advanced their thinking even further. White and 
Selgin (1994) review research in free banking. While they find theoretical case for 
competitive money to be quite sound, they do acknowledge that free banking is not an 
immediately politically feasible option. Hayek (1999[1980], 247) as well, questioned the 
political feasibility of eliminating the government monopoly on note issuance, 
“But through years of further reflection of the problem have only 
confirmed my belief that this ought to be the final solution of our money 
problems. I cannot close my eyes to the fact that any hope for a voluntary 
abdication by governments of their present monopolies of the issues of 
circulating currency is utopian. Yet this is the only way in which we will 
ever get back to honest money again while at the same time ridding 
ourselves of the evils of depression, unemployment and general 
disorganization on the market. Governments have become dependent on 
their power to create money for the finance of their own activities. They 
regard this ability as so essential a weapon of their economic policy, that 
they will probably defend to the last, not merely all the explicit power the 
law has conferred upon them, but also any other power which they can 
obtain.”  
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As Friedman and Schwartz (1986) explain, even if there is no current political aperture 
for the type of monetary regime that Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan were lead to 
support, it is the job of academics to have theories worked out and prepared for when 
they are needed.  And as Selgin and White (1994) conclude, “…a verdict on the 
desirability of monetary laissez faire may motivate the direction taken by marginal 
reforms, within the constraints of the politically possible.” While we admonish the 
monetary theorists who focusing exclusively on technical considerations of monetary 
theory that fall outside of the realm of the politically possible, free banking in the end, 
also falls outside the realm of the politically possible. The key distinction is that in the 
first case, political possibility refers to the epistemic and motivational constraints of man 
as man, and the second case, it is referring to what ideas have advanced to a stage of 
acceptance that would make them possible to implement in a contemporary democratic 
setting. In other words, it is impossible to implement a monetary regime that is based off 
of ideal assumptions among real men, but it is possible to implement a robustly designed 
monetary regime, it just takes various iterations to get people to accept the idea.  
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